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Abstract
The introduction of a plethora of key recovery (KR) schemes and the
lack of a standard has led to interoperability problems between dissimi-
lar mechanisms. To overcome these problems the Key Recovery Alliance
(KRA) has proposed a common Key Recovery Block (KRB) format. This
paper identies some cases that the mechanism fails to achieve its objec-
tives.
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1 Introduction
The deployment of cryptographic mechanisms for data condentiality has re-
sulted in the introduction of key recovery (escrow) services. These will poten-
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tially be used both by companies as well as by individuals who do not want to
lose their encryption keys and therefore have no access to their data. Many KR
schemes have been proposed so far by industry and academia. An overview of
some of these mechanisms is given in [1]. The existence of various KR mech-
anisms, with dierent characteristics and more important not compliant to a
standard, has led to interoperability problems.
Consider the case where an entity A using a KR mechanism KRM
A
wants to
communicate with an entity B using a KR mechanism KRM
B
. Assuming that
both entities wish to establish a secure communication with KR capability, both
of them have to make use of their KR mechanisms. The problem that arises
in such a case is whether these two mechanisms can interoperate, i.e. whether
\KRM
A
can set up a KR enabled cryptographic association with KRM
B
"[2].
The problem becomes more visible when one or both of the entities want, or
are obliged due to policy restrictions, to validate the KR information received
from the peer entity prior to decryption of the ciphertext. That is, both entities
want to make sure that the peer entity makes proper use of the KR mechanism.
Due to the increasing number of KR schemes commercially available, and not
compliant with a standard, it will be infeasible forKRM
B
to know the semantic
details of all the mechanisms and be able to parse the KR information received
from A. The KR information in many KR mechanisms is within a Key Recovery
Field (KRF). In [2] two main types of KRFs are identied. The rst one is found
in a key escrowmechanism and basically contains the session key encrypted with
the recipient's public key. Such a mechanism requires access to the recipient's
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private key which in turn enables the recovery of the session key. In a key
encapsulation mechanism, however, the session key is encrypted with the public
key(s) of the Recovery Agent(s). This type of mechanism allows the Recovery
Agent to directly recover the session key.
The diering requirements of the available KR mechanisms and the varying
formats of their KRFs (when one is used) have led to interoperability problems.
In many situations the KRFs cannot be interpreted and therefore cannot be
used at all. This might lead to suspension of communications as in many
cases the communicating entities' policies might explicitly require validation
of the KR information prior to decryption. Thus, it becomes obvious that a
mechanism is needed that will enable the entities to validate the KR information
received.
2 KRA's model
To overcome the interoperability problems described in the previous section the
Key Recovery Alliance (KRA) has proposed a mechanism which, when adopted,
enables communications between dissimilar KR mechanisms. The mechanism
introduces a Key Recovery Block (KRB) that \serves as a container for a single
KR mechanism-specic KRF" [2]. The KRB according to [2] achieves two main
objectives; it \provides a means to identify the KR mechanism used to construct
the KRF", and, \provides a range of validation techniques, including those that
allow validation of the KR information in generic, KR mechanism-independent
ways".
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2.1 Description of the KRB and its validation mechanisms
In this section brief descriptions of the KRB and the KRB validation techniques
are given. For full details and explanations of the mechanism see [2]. The KRB
consists of the following elds:
 KRB Version Number.
 KRB Length: The number of words in the entire KRB.
 Object Identier (OID) for KRF: The OID for the KR mechanism
used to generate the KRF, as registered with a central authority.
 Reserved: A 16-bit eld reserved for future use.
 KRF Length: Number of words in the KRF.
 Key Recovery Field: The proprietary KRF whose format and contents
are indicated by the OID.
 Validation Field Type: Identies one of the following seven techniques
used to compute the Validation
1. NONE(Type 0): No Validation Field Value (VFV) is calculated;
KRF validation is unnecessary at the decrypting side.
2. SEMANTIC(Type 1): No VFV is calculated; the KRF should be
validated semantically using the mechanism-specic algorithm.
3. PROTOCOL(Type 2): No VFV is calculated; the KRB need not
be checked for validity since the carrier protocol provides integrity
protection for the KRB.
4
4. CONF-HMAC-SHA-1-96(Type 3): The VFV is a hash of the
KRB using HMAC and SHA-1 and the condentiality key associated
with the KRF.
5. CONF-HMAC-MD5-96(Type 4): The VFV is a hash of the
KRB using HMAC and MD-5 and the condentiality key associated
with the KRF.
6. INTEG-HMAC-SHA-1-96(Type 5): The VFV is a hash of the
KRB using HMAC and SHA-1 and the integrity key associated with
the KRF.
7. INTEG-HMAC-MD5-96(Type 6): The VFV is a hash of the
KRB using HMAC and MD-5 and the integrity key associated with
the KRF.
 Validation Field Length: Number of words in the VFV.
 Validation Field Value: It is calculated over the entire KRB.
3 Problems identied in this mechanism
The mechanism proposed by the KRA, as mentioned above, promises to pro-
mote interoperability between dissimilar mechanisms. However, two problems
can be identied within this mechanism. The rst relates to diculties arising
from the generation of proprietary KRFs while the other concerns the fact that
in many cases the mechanism fails to provide interoperability.
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3.1 KRF generation
The paper makes the silent assumption that a KRF has already been gener-
ated and therefore it is always available for the KRB generation. However,
this is feasible only in a very limited number of combinations of the various
KR schemes. In the case of non-interoperable mechanisms, the sender might
not be able to generate a KRF because the receiver's end does not fulll the
requirements of the sender's KR mechanism. Consider the case, in its simplest
approach, where the KRF generation requires the encryption of the secret ses-
sion key (data encryption key) using the public key of the receiver (because the
sender is using a key escrow mechanism). If the receiver does not have a public
key because he is not using key escrow but a key encapsulation mechanism (or
a public key that he might have does not fulll the requirements of the sender's
KR mechanism) the sender cannot oblige the receiver to get one. Therefore the
sender cannot generate a KRF.
3.2 Interoperability issues
Among the Validation Field Types proposed in [2] there are ve (types 2{6)
which provide validation of the KRB. According to [2], using the generic valida-
tion mechanisms supported by the KRB, entity B would be able to validate the
proprietary KRF sent by A and vice versa, \even though B did not understand
how to parse the KRF". However, the placement of the KRF within the KRB
does not enable this validation. The receiving entity still has to parse the KRF
to check its validity. The integrity, condentiality, and/or authentication of the
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KRB and therefore of the content of the KRB, the KRF, does not guarantee
the latter's validity.
As a consequence, the validation techniques proposed are vulnerable to a single
rogue user scenario. Consider the case where two parties communicate using
dissimilar (non-interoperable) KR mechanisms. Sender A generates a KRF for
the receiver B who is not able to verify the proprietary KRF using the method
required by A's KR mechanism because he is using a dissimilar KR mechanism.
Assuming further that A is a rogue user, then the following scenario might take
place: A generates a non-valid KRF. However, the Validation Field Value is
generated using the valid session key (validation eld types 3-6) which the
receiver knows in advance. A genuine receiver B will validate correctly the
KRB, as this was correctly generated by A. However, the validation technique
and therefore the validation of the KR information has just failed because the
KRF is not genuine and B has no means to verify that (we assume that the
two mechanisms are not compliant and therefore B does not know the semantic
details of KRM
A
). Thus B will not be compliant with his policy which requires
validation of the KRF prior to decryption of the encrypted data.
Moreover a Key Recovery Agent that A is associated with will not be able to
recover the key. This is because the KRA will not try to recover the key using
the KRB but using the KRF contained in it. However, the KRB was accepted
as valid by B. In other words the KRB does not play the main role of the
KRF which is to give information on the session key. It is only a mechanism
that can provide integrity, condentiality, or/and authentication but it is not a
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\mechanism for verifying the validation of the enclosed KRF" [2, page 7]. There
is no way to recover the key from the KRB using only the information provided
by the KRB itself (excluding the KRF because this can be manipulated only by
the users that deploy the same product). In the case of Validation Field Type
7 the same problem holds, as the Validation Field Value is a digital signature
on the KRB which can carry a non-valid KRF. The only types that do not
suer from this problem are types 0 and 1 which demand \no validation" and
\mechanism specic validation" respectively.
Therefore the solution proposed here does not achieve one of the two major
objectives mentioned above, which is to provide \the ability to validate the KR
information in a way that does not require knowledge of the exact semantic
properties of the KRF". The solution fails to achieve its objective in situations
where it is most desirable, i.e. in environments where there is a lack of trust.
The mechanisms where the KRF comprises the key exchange block do not suer
from the above problem because in such a case the KRF has to be processed to
obtain the decryption key. However, these mechanisms face the problem where
the sender cannot generate a KRF and if one is generated the receiving end
might not be able to parse it and get the session key. The KRB proposed does
not oer an alternative to this situation since the receiving end cannot obtain
the session key using interoperable components.
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4 Conclusions
This paper has looked at two problems inherent in the KRA proposal for in-
teroperability of dissimilar key recovery mechanisms. The mechanism proposed
oers an ecient way of carrying the KRF with condentiality, integrity, and/or
authentication but not a way of validating the KRF itself. Thus the proposed
scheme fails to achieve one of its main objectives.
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